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Abstract
We propose a novel method for modeling data by using structural models based on
economic theory as regularizers for statistical models. We show that even if a structural
model is misspecified, as long as it is informative about the data-generating mechanism,
our method can outperform both the (misspecified) structural model and un-structural-
regularized statistical models. Our method permits a Bayesian interpretation of theory
as prior knowledge and can be used both for statistical prediction and causal inference.
It contributes to transfer learning by showing how incorporating theory into statisti-
cal modeling can significantly improve out-of-domain predictions and offers a way to
synthesize reduced-form and structural approaches for causal effect estimation. Simula-
tion experiments demonstrate the potential of our method in various settings, including
first-price auctions, dynamic models of entry and exit, and demand estimation with in-
strumental variables. Our method has potential applications not only in economics,
but in other scientific disciplines whose theoretical models offer important insight but
are subject to significant misspecification concerns.
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1 Introduction
Structural models are causal models based on economic theory. A complete structural model
describes economic and social phenomena as the outcomes of individual behavior in specific
economic and social environments. The structural approach to data analysis takes a struc-
tural model as a truthful representation of the data-generating mechanism and estimates
the model parameters from observed data. The estimated model can then be used to make
predictions, evaluate causal effects, and conduct welfare analyses1.
One of the main strengths of structural estimation lies in its ability to make claims of
generalizability or external validity. Because a structural model is based on economic theory,
its parameters – such as those governing preferences and technology – can be “deep,” or
policy-invariant, so that the estimated model can be used to generate predictions in different
environments. A key assumption involved, however, is that the model is correctly specified.
In practice, there is no such guarantee and structural models are often criticized for relying
on strong, unrealistic assumptions and identification by functional form. This has limited
the usefulness of the structural approach and its empirical success2.
In this paper, we propose a new methodology for modeling data that both inherits the
desirable property of structural estimation – the ability to make claims of external validity
– and incorporates a robustness against model misspecification. The method, which we
call the structural regularization estimator (SRE ), treats a given structural model as the
benchmark model and estimates a flexible statistical model with a penalty on deviance from
the structural benchmark. Equivalently, we select the best statistical model to describe the
data within a neighborhood of the structural model. We show that even if the structural
model is misspecified, as long as it is informative about the true data-generating mechanism,
our method can outperform both the (misspecified) structural model and un-structural-
regularized statistical models.
1See Reiss and Wolak (2007), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) and Low and Meghir (2017) for surveys on
structural estimation.
2Heckman (2000): “The empirical track record of the structural approach is, at best, mixed. Economic
data, both micro and macro, have not yielded many stable structural parameters. Parameter estimates from
the structural research program are widely held not to be credible.” Rust (2014): “Looking back nearly four
decades after the Lucas critique paper, it is fair to ask whether structural models really have succeeded and
resulted in significantly more accurate and reliable policy forecasting and evaluation.”
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Our method belongs to a class of regularized regression models. In contrast to popular
methods such as ridge regression and the lasso, which shrink the parameters of a regression
model toward zero to achieve a balance between bias and variance, the SRE shrinks the
parameters of a statistical model toward those values implied by the structural model so as
to achieve a balance between maximizing statistical fit and minimizing deviance from theory.
The SRE permits a Bayesian interpretation of using theory as prior knowledge. From a
Bayesian perspective, regularization amounts to the use of informative priors that introduce
our beliefs about the observed data (Li and Goel, 2006). Classic priors used for regularization
in statistics and machine learning include sparsity and smoothness priors. In this paper, we
argue that since theoretical models are formulated based on the results of previously observed
information and conducted studies, they should naturally serve as priors for analyzing new
evidence.
Our method can be used both for statistical prediction and causal inference. When used
for statistical prediction, it contributes to the literature on transfer learning by showing
how incorporating theory into statistical modeling can significantly improve out-of-domain
prediction. Given a predictive task involving inputs x and outcome y, a key limitation with
most statistical methods is that they require the distributions governing the training and
the test data to be the same in order to guarantee performance3. In the machine learning
literature, the problem of applying a model trained on a source domain with distribution PSxy
to a target domain with distribution PTxy 6= PSxy is known as transfer learning4,5. A majority
of research on transfer learning so far has focused on domain adaptation6, where the marginal
distributions of the inputs differ across domains, i.e. PSx 6= PTx , but the conditional outcome
distributions remain the same, i.e. PSy|x = PTy|x. Methods that have been proposed aim to
reduce the difference in input distributions either by sample-reweighting (Zadrozny, 2004;
3This remains true for state-of-the-art deep learning models. See Donahue et al. (2014) and Yosinski
et al. (2014) for discussions on how features extracted from deep convolutional neural networks trained on
large image datasets are susceptible to various domain shifts.
4Several definitions of domain exist in the transfer learning literature. In this paper, given (x, y) ∈ O
and a joint distribution Pxy on O, we define domain as a pair 〈O,Pxy〉. Note that this notion of domain is
different from that of the domain of a function.
5See Pan and Yang (2010) for a survey on transfer learning. Ben-David et al. (2010) provides a theoretical
treatment on learning from different domains.
6Also known as covariate shift or transductive transfer learning (Pan and Yang, 2010).
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Huang et al., 2007; Jiang and Zhai, 2007; Sugiyama et al., 2008) or by finding a domain-
invariant transformation (Pan et al., 2010; Gopalan et al., 2011)7. Few studies, however, have
dealt with the more difficult problem of when both Px and Py|x change across domains8.
In this paper, we note that transfer learning can be viewed as a counterfactual prediction
problem. If the source and the target domain are governed by the same data-generating
mechanism, then a structural model that correctly describes this mechanism, when esti-
mated on the source domain, will generalize naturally to the target domain, even if both
the marginal and the conditional distributions have changed. In the context of transfer
learning, the external validity of a structural model translates into domain-invariance. Fun-
damentally, this is because causal relationships are more stable than statistical relationships
(Pearl, 2009)9. On the other hand, if a structural model is misspecified yet informative
about the data-generating mechanism, then it may not compete with the best statistical
models in-domain, but can still provide useful guidance for extrapolating out-of-domain10.
This intuition motivates our estimator. Indeed, we show that the SRE can significantly
outperform un-structural-regularized statistical models in out-of-domain prediction whether
we are given a correctly specified or a misspecified but informative structural model11.
Our method also contributes to the literature on causal effect estimation by offering a
7This includes the more recent deep domain adaptation literature that employs deep neural networks for
domain adaptation. See Glorot et al. (2011); Chopra et al. (2013); Ganin and Lempitsky (2014); Tzeng et al.
(2014); Long et al. (2015). Wang and Deng (2018) provides an overview of this literature in the context of
computer vision.
8The problem is known as inductive transfer learning (Pan and Yang, 2010). While a number of methods
have been proposed to deal with this problem, they all require target domain data in training – we need
to observe some {xi, yi} in the target domain. See Schwaighofer et al. (2005); Dai et al. (2007); Gao et al.
(2008); Wang and Schneider (2014). These methods mostly adapt multi-task learning algorithms and are
not solutions to the problem of generalizing model predictions to different domains in a strict sense.
9Motivated by the idea that causal relationships are more stable, Rojas-Carulla et al. (2018) propose
“causal transfer learning.” Kuang et al. (2020) propose “stable prediction”. Both studies rely on the as-
sumption that a subset of the input variables v ⊆ x have a causal relation with the outcome y and the
conditional probability P (y|v) is invariant across domains. However, it is not true that having a causal
relationship implies P (y|v) is domain-invariant. Let w = x\v. The assumption only holds under very limited
and untestable conditions, namely that y ⊥ w|v and that the causal effect of v on y is homogeneous.
10In this paper, we distinguish between the notion of out-of-domain and out-of-sample. Out-of-sample
data are test data drawn from the same distribution as the training data.
11Note that we do not claim superiority over un-structural-regularized statistical models in-domain, since
one can always pick a statistical model flexible enough to generate good in-domain (out-of-sample) perfor-
mance – performance on test data drawn from the same distribution on which the model is estimated. Hence
the main contribution of the SRE to statistical prediction is in terms of its out-of-domain performance, i.e.
the ability to extrapolate.
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way to combine the nonstructural statistical approach to causal inference with the struc-
tural approach. The nonstructural approach, also known as the reduced-form approach12,
estimates causal effects from observational data using statistical models. Knowledge of the
data-generating mechanism is used not to specify a complete causal model, but to inform
research designs that can identify the causal effects of interest by exploiting exogenous vari-
ations in the data. Reduced-form methods, including selection on observables regression,
instrumental variables regression, difference-in-differences estimation and so on, are widely
used in applied economic analyses. At their best, these methods take advantage of credible
sources of identifying information to deliver estimates that have high internal validity13. On
the other hand, they have also been criticized for learning effects that are local and lack
justifications for external validity. Which approach should be preferred – the structural or
the reduced-form – has been the subject of a long-standing debate within the economics
profession14. This debate has at times been framed as a disagreement over the role of the-
ory in data analysis, with some authors emphasizing the limits to inference without theory
(Wolpin, 2013) and others emphasizing the limits with theory (Rust, 2014).
We show that the SRE offers a way to reconcile and synthesize these two competing ap-
proaches and philosophies. Theory, in our approach, informs but not dictates data analysis.
Technically, by using structural models to regularize the functional form of reduced-form
models, we can effectively select models that sit “in the interior of the continuum between
reduced-form and structural estimation” (Chetty, 2009). The resulting estimator has the
ability to leverage the strengths of both approaches – the internal validity of reduced-form
12As Chetty (2009) points out, the term “reduced-form” is largely a misnomer, whose meaning in the
econometrics literature today has departed from its historical root. Historically, a reduced-form model is
an alternative representation of a structural model. Given a structural model M(x, y, ) = 0, where x is
exogenous, y is endogenous, and  is unobserved, if we write y as a function of x and , y = f(x, ), then
f is the reduced-form ofM (Reiss and Wolak, 2007). Today, however, applied economists typically refer to
nonstructural, statistical treatment effect models as “reduced-form” models. Perhaps reflecting the informal
nature of the terminology today, Rust (2014) gives the following definitions of the two approaches: “At the
risk of oversimplifying, empirical work that takes theory “seriously” is referred to as structural econometrics
whereas empirical work that avoids a tight integration of theory and empirical work is referred to as reduced
form econometrics.”
13Angrist and Pischke (2010) offer an account of what they call “the credibility revolution” – the increasing
popularity of quasi-experimental methods that seek natural experiments as sources of identifying information.
Our definition of reduced-form methods include both quasi-experimental and more traditional, non-quasi-
experimental methods that use prior information to locate exogenous sources of variation.
14See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000); Angrist and Pischke (2010); Keane (2010a,b); Nevo and Whinston
(2010); Deaton (2010); Heckman (2010) for different perspectives on the structural vs. reduced-form debate.
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methods and the external validity of structural estimation – while defending against their
weaknesses15.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach using a set of simulation experiments
designed to showcase its power under a variety of realistic settings in applied economic analy-
ses, including first-price auctions, dynamic models of entry and exit, and demand estimation
with instrumental variables. For each experiment, we compare the in-domain and out-of-
domain performance of our estimator with that of structural and (reduced-form) statistical
estimation. We consider a number of scenarios in which the benchmark structural model is
misspecified. In particular, we consider cases in which individual agents deviate from perfect
rationality and display various degrees of non-optimizing behavior or boundedly-rational ex-
pectations. These cases pose significant challenges to structural estimation due to a lack of
identifiable, consensus models for non-rational behavior. Dynamic models in both macro-
and microeconomics, for example, have long relied on the rational expectations assumption
despite its well-known limitations. In all of these cases, we show that based on benchmark
models that assume perfect rationality, the SRE is nevertheless able to obtain results that
are much closer to the true non-rational models and, as a consequence, generates much more
accurate out-of-domain predictions than (reduced-form) statistical models.
Several authors have proposed combining structural and reduced-form estimation (Chetty,
2009; Heckman, 2010). Their solution is to use structural models to derive sufficient statistics
for the intended analysis and then use reduced-form methods to estimate them. In compar-
ison, we offer a general algorithm rather than relying on ad hoc derivations16. In a paper
concurrent with ours, Mao and Xu (2020) propose two novel ways for combining structural
and reduced-form models, one with a doubly robust construction and the other a weighted
ensemble. Their methods can be viewed as complementary to ours.
Our method is most closely related to Fessler and Kasy (2019) (FK) who also propose
the idea of using theory to regularize statistical models. In their framework, theory is
represented as a set of constraints on the parameters of a statistical model. They propose an
empirical Bayes approach that first estimates the statistical model without constraints and
15As a price to pay, the SRE largely loses its structural interpretation and cannot be used to conduct
welfare analyses. We discuss this limitation in section on page 43.
16However, our method cannot be used to conduct welfare analysis, which is the focus of Chetty (2009).
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then project the estimated parameters, β̂, onto a subspace defined by theoretical restrictions.
These projected values, β̂0 are then used as priors to obtain the parameters’ posterior means
which shrink β̂ towards β̂0. Compared with their approach, our method is different in its
construction and has arguably a number of key advantages. First, FK assumes a statistical
model whose parameters are identified and are consistently and unbiasedly estimated in
the absence of theoretical constraints. We do not impose such assumptions. The statistical
model that we shrink toward our structural benchmark can be complex and high-dimensional.
While FK also assumes their statistical model to be correctly specified, we regard ours as
an approximation to an unknown target function, allowing the potential use of adaptive
methods such as random forests and neural nets. Second, a key requirement for FK is that
theory has to be expressed as a set of constraints on the statistical parameters. This puts
significant limitations on the type of theoretical models that can be considered as well as
requires an ad hoc approach to find a statistical model that nests the theoretical model for
each application. In contrast, the structural model that we use as our benchmark can be
highly complicated, whose assumptions have no obvious ways of being expressed as a set of
constraints on a statistical model, and whose parameter space can have a higher dimension.
This include models such as dynamic discrete choice models and dynamic games that are
widely used in empirical applications. Our method is general and does not require ad hoc
constructions. Third and perhaps most importantly, while FK focuses on improving the in-
domain performance of statistical estimators with theory, our goal is to achieve both good in-
domain and out-of-domain predictive performance and obtain estimates with both internal
and external validity. Moreover, we note that when it comes to in-domain performance,
compared to a purely statistical approach, FK’s method is mainly useful in a limited setting
in which the sample sizeN is larger but not significantly larger than the number of parameters
p. This is because the empirical Bayes estimator can improve the precision of estimates when
the sample size is small, but the improvement vanishes as the sample size grows large. In
contrast, we show that the advantage of our SRE relative to a purely statistical approach is
in its out-of-domain performance, i.e. its ability to extrapolate17. Such advantage does not
17Fessler and Kasy (2019) prove that their estimator dominates (in terms of MSE) the unconstrained
statistical model that they estimate in the first step. But this result holds for all James-Stein type shrinkage
estimators. Conceptually, shrinking to anything has the effect of trampling down the variability of a statistical
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disappear no matter how much data we observe in-domain.
Finally, this paper is related to the robustness literature in economics and statistics.
Motivated by Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2010, 2020)’s work on robust decision making
under model misspecification18, Bonhomme and Weidner (2018) develop a locally robust
minimax estimator that minimizes maximum expected loss over a statistical neighborhood
of a benchmark model using local linearization techniques. In a Bayesian setting, Giacomini
et al. (2019) analyzes partially identified models by constructing a class of priors in a neigh-
borhood of a benchmark prior and obtaining the optimal posterior minimax decision over
this class. Working on structural models, Christensen and Connault (2019) consider a class
of models defined by equilibrium conditions and characterize the sensitivity of their coun-
terfactuals to deviations from benchmark specifications of the distribution of unobservables.
Like these studies, we are motivated by concerns over model misspecifications. However,
our goal is not to achieve robustness in the sense of minimizing the worst-case impact of
misspecification in a given neighborhood of the benchmark model or quantifying its local
or global sensitivity. The shrinkage method we employ allows arbitrary deviation from the
structural benchmark, so that when it is uninformative, the SRE is “reduced” to a (reduced-
form) statistical model19. Our method allows arbitrary misspecification of the structural
model, unlike Christensen and Connault (2019) whose misspecification concerns are limited
to the distribution of unobservables.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating example
of how our method works in the context of a simple demand estimation problem. Section
3 lays out the details of our algorithm. In section 4 we apply our method to three sets of
simulation experiments in the settings of first-price auctions, dynamic models of entry and
exit, and demand estimation with instrumental variables and report their results. Section 5
concludes.
model when p is large relative to N and thereby helping to lower the MSE. In our simulations, therefore, we
compare the performance of the SRE not against the statistical model that we regularize, but against the best
statistical model we obtain using model selection. We argue that this is the more meaningful comparison.
18See Watson and Holmes (2016) and Hansen and Marinacci (2016) for surveys of recent developments in
statistical decision theory and robust estimation in the presence of model misspecification.
19Pun intended.
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Figure 1: Demand Estimation. Dots represent training data. Circles represent out-of-domain test
data.
2 Motivating Example
As a motivating example, consider a simple demand estimation problem. We observe the
prices and quantities sold of a good x, as plotted in Figure 1a. Suppose the data are
generated by the consumption decisions of N consumers who purchased x at different prices.
Each consumer had fixed income I and decided how much to purchase x by solving the
problem
max
q,qo
ui (q, q
o) subject to pq + poqo ≤ I (1)
8
, where (p, q, po, qo) denote respectively the price and quantity of x and of an outside good
o, and
ui (q, q
o) = [αiq
ρ + (1− αi) (qo)ρ]
1
ρ
, with ρ = −1
2
, implying an elasticity of substitution equal to 0.6720.
We can fit the following statistical model to the data:
qi = β0 + β1pi + β2p
2
i + i (2)
The result is plotted in Figure 1b. If we further make the causal assumption that changes
in p are exogenous, then (2) represents a reduced-form estimate of the individual demand
curve.
The model fits the data well21 and would suffice if our goal is to make sales predictions
in-domain or obtain an internally valid demand curve estimate. However, the fit becomes
bad once we extrapolate outside the observed range of prices, as shown in Figure 1c. More
sophisticated statistical and machine learning models wouldn’t help. In particular, domain
adaptation methods do not apply since both the marginal distribution of p and the condi-
tional distribution of q change once we extrapolate outside the observed domain.
On the other hand, structurally estimating model (1) would yield an estimated curve that
has both internal and external validity (Figure 1c). This is not surprising since (1) describes
the true data-generating mechanism. What happens if we estimate a structural model that
is incorrectly specified? Figure 1d shows the result of estimating (1) but assuming ρ = 0.522.
The structural fit is now poor both in-domain and out-of-domain, highlighting the fact that
the validity of the structural approach hinges crucially on the model being correct.
Our structural regularization approach offers a way to combine statistical and structural
models to address the shortcomings of each. Figure 1d also shows the result of structural
20{αi} are generated as follows:
αi =
exp (ξi)
1 + exp (ξi)
, ξi ∼ N (0, 0.5)
21In practice, (2) is selected from a set of nested polynomial models based on AIC.
22That is, instead of estimating both (αi, ρ) from the data, we estimate αi only while treating ρ = 0.5 as
an assumption of the model. The assumption, of course, is incorrect in this case.
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regularization using the misspecified structural model as the benchmark. Compared to the
structural fit, the SRE fit is closer to the true model both in-domain and out-of-domain.
Compared to the statistical fit, the SRE performs slightly worse in-domain but significantly
better out-of-domain23. While we formally present the structural regularization method in
the next section, this example helps illustrate why a misspecified structural model can be
useful: although we misspecify the utility function, the assumption of consumer utility max-
imization subject to budget constraints provides important information on the relationship
between price and demand that can be used to regulate the behavior of statistical models.
The SRE is therefore able to achieve a balance between producing accurate descriptions of
the data and incorporating theoretical (economic/behavioral) insight that allows it to better
extrapolate beyond the observed domain.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first lay out our method in the context of conditional mean estimation.
We then present it in the general framework of penalized extremum estimation and show
how it can used to fit quantities identified via moment conditions. In each case, we discuss
how our method can be used both for statistical prediction and causal inference.
3.1 Overview
We begin by considering the following statistical prediction problem: given variables (x, y) ∈
O, let Pxy be a joint distribution defined on O that governs (x, y). Our goal is to learn a
target function f (x) that minimizes the expected `2 loss EPxy
[
(y − f (x))2]. Equivalently,
we are interested in estimating the conditional expectation function f (x) = EPy|x [y|x]. We
may not have access, however, to a random sample from Pxy. Instead, we observe data
D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 , (xi, yi) ∈ O′ ⊆ O, with data-generating probability distribution P′xy =
Pxy|(x,y)∈O′ . Classic statistical and machine learning algorithms built on the assumption that
23To generate the results of this example, we shrink a 5− degree polynomial toward the structural bench-
mark. Note that if we compare the resulting SRE fit with this 5−degree polynomial in-domain, as in ?, the
SRE fit will always perform no worse.
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the training data is a random sample of the distribution of interest will thus have difficulty
learning f from D.
We assume that we have at our disposal an identifiable structural model M that we
believe may describe the causal mechanism that generates Pxy. However, the model may
also be misspecified. With this setup, our structural regularization estimator proceeds in two
stages. In the first stage, we estimate the structural modelM on the data D to obtain M̂.
We then use M̂ to generate synthetic data DM = {(xMi , yMi )}Mi=1 , (xMi , yMi ) ∈ O. This is
generally feasible since structural models are generative models capable of simulating new
data and since M is a causal model for Pxy, it can be used to simulate data on the entire
domain 〈O,Pxy〉 rather than on
〈O′,P′xy〉 only24. Based on the estimated model M̂, we can
also compute fM (x) = EM [y|x] – the implied conditional expectation of y according to M̂.
In the second stage, we estimate a flexible statistical model g (x; θ) by seeking solution
to the following problem:
min
θ∈Θ
{
N∑
i=1
(yi − g (xi; θ))2 + λ · Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)}
(3)
, where Ω (., .) is a distance function, λ ≥ 0 is a penalty parameter, and θ̂M is obtained by
fitting g to DM, i.e.25,
θ̂M = arg min
θ∈Θ
M∑
i=1
(
yMi − g
(
xMi ; θ
))2 (4)
= arg min
θ∈Θ
M∑
i=1
(
fM
(
xMi
)− g (xMi ; θ))2 (5)
g
(
x; θ̂M
)
represents a statistical approximation to the model derived conditional mean,
24In practice, this means that if we know, at the time of estimation, where we want to apply our model,
i.e. the target domain input space, then we can use the estimated structural model to generate synthetic
data on the target domain in addition to the source domain in this first stage.
25In practice, to avoid overfitting, one can either generate a very large synthetic set
(
xMi , y
M
i
)
or fit g
directly to
(
xMi , f
M (xMi )), where xMi belongs to a grid of possible values of x.
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fM (x)26,27. θ̂M can therefore be viewed as the “structural” or “theoretical” value of θ. The
term Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)
is a regularizer that penalizes the distance between θ and θ̂M. Typical
choices for Ω (., .) include the `1 norm, Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)
=
∥∥∥θ − θ̂M∥∥∥
1
, or the squared `2 norm,
Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)
=
∥∥∥θ − θ̂M∥∥∥2
2
.
The penalty, or tuning, parameter λ controls the tradeoff between goodness of in-sample
fit and deviance of the statistical model from its structural counterpart. Let θ̂ be the solution
to problem (3). Then g
(
x; θ̂
)
is our SRE estimate of f (x). At one extreme, when λ = 0,
g
(
x; θ̂
)
is a completely unregularized statistical fit. At the other extreme, as λ → ∞,
g
(
x; θ̂
)
approaches its structural counterpart. It is in this sense that the SRE sits in the
interior of the continuum between statistical and structural estimation.
As in standard penalized regression models, (3) is known as the Tikhonov form. Equiv-
alently, it can be expressed in the Ivanov form:
min
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
(yi − g (xi; θ))2 (6)
subject to Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)
≤ C
, which makes it transparent that we can likewise think of the SRE as selecting the best
statistical model to fit the data within a neighborhood C of the structural benchmark.
In practice, the choice of λ or C are determined via cross-validation. To improve the
out-of-domain performance of our estimator, in addition to standard cross-validation pro-
cedures for i.i.d. data, we propose a forward cross-validation procedure that can be useful
in situations in which we know the target domain input space at the time of training. In
addition, to avoid overfitting due to first stage structural estimation, we adopt a sample-
splitting strategy that splits the available training data into independent sets for first and
second stage estimation. These and other details of implementation are given in section 3.4.
26The method of indirect inference (Gourieroux et al., 1993), widely used for fitting structural models whose
complexity makes direct likelihood evaluation difficult, also relies on the use of approximating statistical
models generated by fitting to synthetic data.
27Thus, in contrast to Fessler and Kasy (2019), our method does not require the structural modelM to
be expressed as a set of constraints on the parameters of a statistical model g (x; θ).
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Figure 2: Gaussian Prior for SRE (`2 regularizer)
3.2 Bayesian Interpretation
The SRE permits a Bayesian interpretation28. Specifically, in the case of `2 regularization, θ̂
is the posterior mode of θ under a Gaussian prior centered around θ̂M29. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 for a one-dimensional parameter. The standard deviation of the prior distribution
is inversely proportional to regularization strength – the smaller the standard deviation, the
larger the corresponding λ is and the more confidence is placed on θ̂M being the “true value.”
As in Fessler and Kasy (2019), the use of informative priors centered around theoretically
derived values gives the resulting estimator an appealing understanding of using theory as
prior knowledge for analyzing new evidence30.
28Our method has a proper Bayesian interpretation due to our sample-splitting strategy (section 3.4) that
separates the training data used for first and second stage estimation. Thus, from the perspective of second
stage estimation, θ̂M is exogenously given, so that the prior distribution centered around it does not depend
on the data.
29See, e.g. James et al. (2013). For `1 regularization, the corresponding prior is a double-exponential
(Laplace) distribution (Tibshirani, 1996). Murphy (2012) provides more general discussions on the connection
between regularization and MAP (maximum à posteriori) Bayesian inference.
30Note that the estimator obtained by Fessler and Kasy (2019) is the posterior mean rather than the
posterior mode.
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3.3 Causal Inference
Causal Effect Estimation under Unconfoundedness In this section, we adapt the
estimator introduced in section 3.1 to the problem of causal effect estimation under uncon-
foundedness. Let the observed variables be (y, d, w) ∈ R × R ×W , where y is the outcome
variable, d is the treatment variable, and w is a set of control variables. We are interested in
the causal effect of d on y. Specifically, let our target be the average treatment effect (ATE)
denoted by τ . We allow τ to be fully nonlinear and heterogeneous, i.e. τ = τ (d, w). Under
the unconfoundedness assumption of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)31,
τ (d, w) =
∂
∂d
E [y|d, w] (7)
Let x = (d, w). The task of estimating τ (d, w) is thus equivalent to the task of estimating
E [y|x]. Suppose now that we have a structural modelM that describes the causal mechanism
that generates these variables32, then we can use the SRE to produce g
(
x; θ̂
)
= Ê [y|x], from
which we can derive τ̂ (d, w)33.
As the preceding discussion shows, when the goal is to estimate the ATE under uncon-
foundedness, the difference between the reduced-form statistical approach and the structural
approach boils down to a difference in the choice of the functional form of E [y|x], with the
former traditionally relying on simple linear models – although recent studies increasingly
adopt more complex nonlinear and adaptive machine learning models, while the latter de-
rive the functional form from theory. In a sense, one can argue that critics on either side
31Using the notations of the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974), suppose the treatment variable d takes
on a discrete set of values, d ∈ {1, . . . , D}, then the unconfoundedness – or conditional exchangeability –
assumption can be stated as
d ⊥⊥ (y (1) , . . . , y (D))|w
, where y (d) is the potential outcome of y associated with treatment d. This assumption is satisfied if d
is not associated with any other causes of y conditional on w. A more precise statement on the sufficient
conditions for satisfying this assumption, made in the language of causal graphical models based on directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs), is that w satisfies the back-door criterion (Pearl, 2009).
32Importantly,M does not have to support the unconfoundedness assumption, i.e. in the causal structure
assumed byM , w does not have to satisfy the back-door criterion. This is because the structural model is
used to aid the estimation of E [y|d,w]. The identifying assumption required for interpreting ∂E [y|d,w]/ ∂d
as the (conditional) ATE remains that of unconfoundedness.
33Technically, τ (d,w) is the conditional ATE. With a slight abuse of notation, the population ATE τ (d) =
Ew [τ (d,w)].
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of the methodological debate are motivated by a shared concern over model misspecifica-
tion. Advocates for the reduced-form approach are concerned about the misspecification of
E [y|x] due to the often strong and unrealistic assumptions – causal as well as parametric –
made in structural models, while those advocating for the structural approach are concerned
about misspecifications due to not incorporating theoretical insight – functional forms such
as constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation and the gravity equation of trade
often encode important prior economic knowledge that sophisticated statistical and machine
learning methods would not be able to capture based on training data alone34. The SRE
addresses both of these concerns: our two-stage procedure effectively searches through a
combined statistical and structural model space to arrive at an optimal functional form of
E [y|x] that defends against both types of misspecifications.
Instrumental Variables When the unconfoundedness condition does not hold – when
there is unmeasured confounding – one of the most widely used strategies in reduced-form
inference is to rely on the use of instrumental variables, which are auxiliary sources of
randomness that can be used to identify causal effects. Let our reduced-form statistical
model be y = g (x; θ) + , x = (d, w), where τ (d, w) = ∂g (x; θ)/ ∂d and  is a noise term
that may be correlated with d35. If we have access to a variable z that is correlated with
treatment d and is related to outcome y only through its association with d, then z can serve
as an instrument for d36. In general, given θ ∈ Rk and instrument z ∈ Rl, l ≥ k, θ can be
identified via the following moment conditions:
E [z (y − g (x; θ))] = 0 (8)
34Rust (2014) makes a similar point: “Notice the huge difference in world views. The primary concern of
Leamer, Manski, Pischke, and Angrist is that we rely too much on assumptions that could be wrong, and
which could result in incorrect empirical conclusions and policy decisions. Wolpin argues that assumptions
and models could be right, or at least they may provide reasonable first approximations to reality.”
35In this reduced-form model, g (x; θ) is a statistical model for E [y (d)|w] – the conditional expectation
of the potential outcome of y under treatment d and  is defined as y − g (x; θ). Thus by definition, the
conditional ATE τ (d,w) = ∂g (x; θ)/ ∂d. When E [d] 6= 0, the received treatment d is related to unobserved
factors that also affect y, thus violating the unconfoundedness condition.
36More precisely, the requirement is that E [z] = 0 and ρdz·w 6= 0, where ρzd·w is the partial correlation
of z and d given w. On a causal graph, this translates into the requirement that z is correlated with d and
that every open path connecting z and y has an arrow pointing into d.
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Algorithm 1 Structural Regularization with Sample-Splitting
Require: Observed data D
1: samples {D1,D2} ← Partition(D,K = 2)
2: output θ̂ ← StructuralRegularization(D1,D2)
The function Partition randomly partitions a sample into K equal sized parts. The function
StructuralRegularization takes in two data samples and uses them to produce the SRE
estimates as follows:
1: procedure: StructuralRegularization(sample I, sample J )
2: fit the structural modelM on sample I to obtain M̂
3: use M̂ to generate a synthetic data set DM
4: solve problem (4) on DM to obtain θ̂M
5: substitute θ̂M into problem (3)
6: solve problem (3) on sample J for a grid of λ values and find the optimal λ∗ by cross-
validation
7: return θ̂ as the solution to problem (3) on sample J at λ = λ∗
Assume again that we have a structural modelM that describes the causal mechanism
governing these variables37. Our SRE would proceed as before in the first stage and solve
the following problem in the second stage:
min
θ∈Θ
{
m (θ)′Wm (θ) + λ · Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)}
(9)
, where m (θ) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 mi (θ), mi (θ) = zi (yi − g (xi; θ)) are the moment functions and W
is a l× l weight matrix. Once we obtain θ̂ as a solution to (9), we can derive the conditional
ATE as τ̂ (d, w) = ∂g
(
x; θ̂
)/
∂d.
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we detail the implementation of our algorithm. We begin by showing that
under the setup of section 3.1, our estimator has a closed form solution at any given λ in
the special case of Ω (., .) being an `2 regularizer and g (x; θ) being linear in θ.
Consider g (x; θ) = α + x′β, where x ∈ Rp, θ = (α, β). In practice, the constant term
α should not be penalized. Let x be standardized into x˜ with mean zero. Then we can
37M does not have to contain z. Once we have an estimated model M̂, we can use it to generate and fit
g directly to a synthetic data set
(
xMi , g
M (xMi )) to obtain θ̂M, where gM (xMi ) = EM [y (di)|wi] is the
model derived conditional expectation of the potential outcome under treatment d.
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Algorithm 2 Structural Regularization with Cross-Fitting
1: samples {D1,D2} ← Partition(D,K = 2)
2: θ̂1 ← StructuralRegularization(D1,D2)
3: θ̂2 ← StructuralRegularization(D2,D1)
4: output θ̂ ← 12
(
θ̂1 + θ̂2
)
write our model as g
(
x˜; θ˜
)
= α˜ + x˜′β˜, θ˜ =
(
α˜, β˜
)
. We estimate g
(
x˜; θ˜
)
as follows: in the
first stage, after generating synthetic data DM based on the estimated structural model M̂,
fitting g
(
x˜; θ˜
)
to DM gives
(̂˜αM, ̂˜βM). In the second stage, because x˜ is centered, we have
̂˜α = y. Let y˜ = y − y. Let Ω(β˜, ̂˜βM) = ∥∥∥∥β˜ − ̂˜βM∥∥∥∥2
2
. Then
̂˜
β = argminβ˜
{∥∥∥y˜ − X˜β˜∥∥∥2
2
+ λ
∥∥∥∥β˜ − ̂˜βM∥∥∥∥2
2
}
(10)
=
(
X˜ ′X˜ + λI
)−1(
X˜ ′y˜ + λ̂˜βM) (11)
, where X˜ = [x˜1, . . . , x˜N ]
′ and I is the p×p identity matrix. In the case that X˜ is orthonormal,
(11) can be expressed as ̂˜
β =
1
1 + λ
̂˜
β
OLS
+
λ
1 + λ
̂˜
β
M
(12)
, where ̂˜βOLS is the least squares estimate. In this case, the SRE can be viewed as a weighted
average of statistical and structural estimation.
Sample Splitting We use the technique of sample-splitting (Angrist and Krueger, 1995)
to avoid overfitting and ensure good statistical behavior specially when complex structural
models are employed in the first stage38. The idea of sample-splitting is to split the training
data into two parts to be used respectively for the two stages of estimation, so that θ̂M can
be treated as exogenously given when g (x; θ) is fit in the second stage. The details of our
algorithm with sample-splitting are given in Algorithm 1.
The sample-splitting procedure reduces overfitting at a cost of wasting half of the data
38Angrist and Krueger (1995) propose the use of sample-splitting in the context of instrumental variable
estimation. Related ideas in the statistical literature goes back at least to Bickel (1982).
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Algorithm 3 K-Fold Forward Cross-Validation
FowardCV is a subroutine for performing cross-validation in StructuralRegularization
1: procedure: FowardCV(sample S,K)
2: samples {S1,S2} ← FowardSplit (S)
3: folds {I1, . . . , IK} ← Partition(S1,K)
4: for all λ ∈ Λ do
5: for k = 1 : K do
6: validation set Vk ← Ik ∪ S2
7: training set Tk ← S1\ Ik
8: solve problem (3) on Tk to obtain θ̂k (λ)
9: compute the predicton error of g
(
x; θ̂k (λ)
)
on Vk to obtain validation error ek (λ)
10: return optimal tuning parameter λ∗ ← arg min
λ∈Λ
1
K
∑K
k=1 ek (λ)
Λ is a grid of λ values. The function FowardSplit randomly partitions S into {S1,S2}, satisfying
the following condition: let X1, X2, and XT be compact input spaces associated respectively with S1,
S2 and the target domain, then dH (X2,XT ) < dH (X1,XT ), where dH (., .) denotes the Hausdorff
distance.
in each stage of estimation. To improve efficiency, we can use the cross-fitting procedure
of Chernozhukov et al. (2016, 2017). The idea is to similarly split the original sample into
two parts, but alternately use each part for first and second stage estimation, so that each
data point will participate in both stages albeit not at the same time. The details of our
algorithm with cross-fitting are given in Algorithm 2.
Forward Cross-Validation We use cross-validation to choose the optimal penalty λ in
(3). If we know, at the time of estimation, the target domain on which we want to apply
our model, then there are two ways to further improve the out-of-domain performance of
our estimator. One is to use the estimated structural model to generate synthetic data on
both the source and the target domain in the first stage, as discussed in section 3.1. In
this section, we introduce a forward cross-validation procedure as another way to improve
out-of-domain performance. The idea is to validate on subsets of the data that are “closer”
to the target domain than the subsets on which the model is trained. More specifically, given
a sample S39, we partition S into two parts, S1 and S2 with associated input spaces X1 and
X2, such that dH (X2,XT ) < dH (X1,XT ), where XT is the target domain input space and
dH (., .) is the Hausdorff distance. We then further partition S1 randomly into K − 1 equal
39In practice, S would be the subsample of D on which the second stage estimation is conducted.
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Figure 3: Forward Cross-Validation. Illustrated is one iteration of the procedure, in which the folds
in blue are used for training and the folds in brown are used for validation. While fold 1 − 5 are
iteratively used for training and validation, fold 6 is always used for validation.
sized subsets and perform K− fold cross validation, each time using K − 2 subsets of S1 for
training and validating on a validation set that contains S2 and the remaining subset of S1.
See Algorithm 3 for more details.
The idea of forward CV is perhaps best illustrated in the one-dimensional setting (Figure
3). Here we want to extrapolate the estimated model in the direction of increasing x. To this
end, we perform cross validation by creating a six-fold partition of the sample data, where the
sixth fold lies in the direction of increasing x compared to the remaining five and is always in
the validation set. Doing so helps produce tuning parameters whose corresponding models
have superior extrapolation performance in the intended direction40.
Adaptive Models The statistical model that we shrink toward the structural benchmark
can be adaptive itself, allowing the potential use of machine learning methods like random
forests and neural nets with structural regularization. Let h (x; θ, γ) be such a model with
hyperparameter γ. To incorporate h into our estimator, we can modify Algorithm 1 as
follows. Split the initial training data into three parts: {D1,D2,D3}. We first fit h to
D1 to obtain the optimal λ = λ∗. Let g (x; θ) = h (x; θ, λ∗). g (x; θ) then enters into the
standard SRE algorithm, with D2 and D3 used respectively for structural estimation and
40When the data has a time series structure, a rolling-window design can be used for cross-validation, as
is commonly used for model selection in time series forecasting. See section B for an application.
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regularization. The modified algorithm thus becomes a three-stage procedure. Algorithm 2
can be adapted similarly with the three parts of data used alternately for the three stages
of estimation.
3.5 Extension
In general, the SRE can be formulated as a penalized extremum estimator that seeks solution
to the following problem in the second stage:
min
θ∈Θ
{
Lg (S; θ) + λ · Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)}
(13)
, where Lg (S; θ) is an objective function associated with g (x; θ) and evaluated on sample S.
This setup encompasses many possibilities. The statistical model g can be discriminative
or generative. The objective function can be based on any appropriate loss functions such as
the quadratic loss and the cross-entropy (negative likelihood) loss. When θ is identified via
moment functions E [m (θ)] = 0, we obtain (9) as a special case of (13). In addition, in the
special case that g (x; θ) = x′θ, x ∈ Rp, Ω
(
θ, θ̂M
)
=
∥∥∥θ − θ̂M∥∥∥2
2
, andm (θ) = z (y − g (x; θ)),
where z ∈ Rl, l ≥ p is an instrument for x, we have the following analytical solution to (9)
for a given λ:
θ̂ = (X ′ZWZ ′X + λI)−1
(
X ′ZWZ ′Y + λθ̂M
)
(14)
, where X = [x1, . . . , xN ]
′, Z = [z1, . . . , zN ]
′, and I is the p× p identity matrix41,42.
4 Applications
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and compare its finite-sample
performance with that of statistical and structural estimation in three economic applications
using Monte Carlo simulations. Taken together, these exercises cover prediction and causal
inference (both under unconfoundedness and confounding) problems, static and dynamic
41In practice, it is often desirable as in (10) not to penalize the constant term in g.
42One can useW = E
[
m (θ0)m (θ0)
′]−1, the efficient weight of Hansen (1982), and obtain θ̂ via a two-step
procedure. This however may not be the optimal weight for our estimator. We leave the characterization of
the asymptotic properties of the SRE as well as the optimal weighting matrix for (9) to future work.
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Table 1: First-price Auction - Setup
Experiment True Mechanism Structural Model
1 vi
i.i.d.∼ U(0, 1), bi = b (vi)
vi
i.i.d.∼ U(0, 1), bi = b (vi)2 vi i.i.d.∼ Beta(2, 5), bi = b (vi)
3 vi
i.i.d.∼ U(0, 1), bi = ηi · b (vi)
Notes: b (vi) is the equilibrium bid function (16). ηi
i.i.d.∼ TN (0, 0.25, 0,∞).
settings, and individual behavior that deviates in various ways from perfect rationality.
A First-Price Auction
In our first application, we consider first-price sealed-bid auctions. Auctions are one of
the most important market allocation mechanisms. Over the past twenty years, empirical
analysis of auction data has been transformed by structural estimation of auction models
based on games of incomplete information43. Structural analysis of auction data views the
observed bids as equilibrium outcomes and attempts to recover the distribution of bidders’
private values by estimating relationships derived directly from equilibrium bid functions.
This approach, while offering a tight integration of theory and observations, relies on a set
of strong assumptions on the information structure and rationality of bidders (Bajari and
Hortacsu, 2005).
In this exercise, we conduct three experiments by simulating auction data with varying
number of participants under three scenarios. The first scenario features rational bidders with
independent private values drawn from a uniform distribution. The second scenario features
rational bidders whose values are drawn from a beta distribution. The third scenario features
boundedly-rational bidders whose bids deviate from optimal bidding strategies. Assume that
we are interested in the relationship between the number of bidders n and the winning bid
b∗, E [b∗|n]. In each experiment, we estimate E [b∗|n] using (a) a statistical model, (b) a
structural model, and (c) the SRE. The structural model we use assumes rational bidders
with uniform private value distribution and is thus correctly specified for Experiment 1 but
43See Paarsch and Hong (2006); Athey and Haile (2007); Hickman et al. (2012); Perrigne and Vuong (2019)
for surveys on econometric analysis of auction data
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misspecified in Experiment 2 and 3. Table 1 summarizes this setup. Below we detail the
data-generating models of the three experiments.
Setup Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with n risk-neutral bidders with indepen-
dent private value vi ∼i.i.d. F (v). Each bidder submits a bid bi to maximize her expected
return
pii = (vi − bi)× Pr (bi > max {b−i}) (15)
, where b−i denotes the other submitted bids. In Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, each bidder’s
bidding strategy is given by
b (v) = v − 1
F (v)n−1
∫ vi
0
F (x)n−1dx (16)
For Experiment 1 and 3, we let F be U (0, 1). In this case, the equilibrium bid function
simplifies to b (v) = n−1
n
v. For Experiment 2, we let F be Beta (2, 5). In each experiment, we
simulate repeated auctions with varying number of bidders44. For Experiment 1 and 2, the
observed bids bi are the equilibrium outcomes, i.e. bi = b (vi). For experiment 3, we let bi =
ηi · b (vi), where ηi follows a normal distribution left-truncated at 0, ηi i.i.d.∼ TN (0, 0.25, 0,∞).
Bidders in Experiment 3 thus “overbid” relative to the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Simulation For each experiment, we simulate M = 100 auctions with number of bidders
nm varying between 5 and 30. The observed data thus consist of D = {{bmi }nmi=1}Mm=1. In this
exercise, our goal is to learn E [b∗|n], the relationship between the number of bidders and
the winning bid. To this end, three different types of estimators are used to estimate E [b∗|n]
from the training data. To assess their performance, we use the true data-generating models
to compute E [b∗|n] for n ∈ [5, 50], so that we can compare the predictions of the estimators
with the true value both in-domain and out-of-domain.
Statistical Estimation To estimate E [b∗|n] using a statistical model45, the data we need
are {(nm, b∗m)}Mm=1, where b∗m is the winning bid of auction m. We fit the following p−degree
44Assuming the same object is being repeatedly auctioned.
45Since n is exogenous, E [b∗|n] is also a causal relationship and (17) can also be thought of a reduced-form
model of the effect of the number of bidders on the winning bid.
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polynomial to the data:
b∗m = β0 +
p∑
j=1
βjn
j
m + em (17)
, where the optimal degree p is determined based on information criteria.
Structural Estimation We structurally estimate the data from each experiment using
a model M that assumes bidders are rational, risk-neutral, and have independent private
values drawn from a U (0, 1) distribution. Under these assumptions, the bidders’ private
values can be easily identified from the observed bids in each auction by vi = nn−1bi
46. The
structural model makes it even easier to make predictions on the winning bid: the model
implies that E [b∗|n] = n
n+1
. No estimation is necessary.
Structural Regularization We useM as the benchmark model for the SRE and specify
a 5−degree polynomial for the statistical model g (n; θ) that we shrink toward the structural
benchmark. Let g
(
n˜; θ˜
)
be the model after n is standardized, as described in section 3.4.
For regularizer, we use
Ω
(
β˜,
̂˜
β
M)
=
5∑
j=1
j ·
(
β˜j − ̂˜βMj )2 (18)
, where β˜ are the non-intercept coefficients of θ˜. (18) is commonly used for regularizing
polynomial models. It puts more penalty on higher degrees of a polynomial and has the effect
of making the resulting fit more stable47. The regularization procedure follows Algorithm 1
with sample-splitting and forward CV.
46In general, if we do not impose the assumption that vi
i.i.d.∼ U(0, 1) and assume instead that vi i.i.d.∼ F (v),
with F unknown, then we can identify and estimate vi using the following strategy based on Guerre et al.
(2000): let G (b) and g (b) be the distribution and density of the bids. (16) implies
vi = bi +
1
n− 1
G (bi)
g (bi)
Thus, by nonparametrically estimating G (b) and g (b) from the observed bids, we can obtain an estimate of
vi.
47Assuming that the model parametrized by ̂˜βM is more stable, which is typically the case, since it is
obtained by fitting to a very large synthetic data set generated by the structural model.
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Figure 4: First-price Auction - The relationship between the number of bidders and the winning
bid. Dots represent training data. Circles represent out-of-domain test data. (a) - (b): Experiment
1; (c) - (d): Experiment 2; (e) - (f): Experiment 3.
24
Table 2: First-price Auction - Results
In-Domain Out-of-Domain
Experiment Estimator Bias Var MSE Bias Var MSE
1
Statistical 0.0037 0.0003 0.0003 0.1256 118.8697 118.9157
Structural 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SRE 0.0035 0.001 0.0001 0.0431 0.2690 0.2734
2
Statistical 0.1251 0.1129 0.1426 3.5506 572.1151 595.3736
Structural 9.8255 0.0000 98.5233 12.6631 0.0000 160.6319
SRE 0.2772 0.0883 0.2399 0.3359 12.7092 12.8710
3
Statistical 0.1455 0.1987 0.2307 0.5285 18.2734 18.5692
Structural 7.7095 0.0000 60.4870 9.8956 0.0000 98.0982
SRE 0.2787 0.1991 0.3215 0.4517 817.5363 817.8250
Notes: results are based on 100 simulation trials. Reported are the mean bias, variance, and
MSE, averaged over the number of bidders n. Since the structural model predicts E [b∗|n] =
(n− 1)/ (n+ 1), its predictions have zero variance.
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Results Figure 4a and 4b show the results of the first experiment. Figure 4a plots the
number of participants n against the winning bid b∗, the true E [b∗|n], as well as predictions
by the estimated statistical, structural, and SRE model. All three models fit very well in-
domain. Since the structural model is the true model, it predicts the true expected winning
bids. The statistical model – here a 2nd degree polynomial – also closely approximates the
target function and could suffice if our goal is to obtain a good in-domain fit. Figure 4b plots
the results of extrapolating the model predictions from n ∈ [5, 30] to n ∈ [30, 50]. While
the structural predictions still hold true, the statistical fit becomes very bad. On the other
hand, the SRE fit remains close to the true relationship both in-domain and out-of-domain
and can accurately predict winning bids well beyond the observed range of n.
Figure 4c− 4f show the results of Experiment 2 and 3. In both experiments, the structural
model is misspecified. In Experiment 2, it misspecifies the private value distribution. In
Experiment 3, it assumes that bidders are rational and the observed bids are Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium outcomes when they are not. As a consequence, in both cases, the structural fit
deviates from the true model significantly. The statistical model, like in Experiment 1, is able
to fit well in-domain but poorly out-of-domain. Remarkably, the SRE continues to perform
well despite relying on a misspecified benchmark model. Its predictions are close to the
true expected winning bids both in-domain and out-of-domain. Intuitively, the misspecified
structural models still provide useful guidance on the functional form of E [b∗|n] when we
extrapolate beyond the observed domain, as evidenced in Figure 4d and 4f.
In Table 2, we report the mean bias, variance, and mean squared error of the three
estimators for 100 simulation runs48. For all three experiments, the SRE has a low MSE
comparable to those of the statistical model and of the true structural model in-domain,
while achieving a significantly lower out-of-domain MSE than both the statistical model and
the structural model when the latter is misspecified.
48Reported are the mean bias, variance, and mean squared error, averaged over the number of bidder
n. Given an estimator f , let f (r) (n) denote the estimator’s prediction of the winning bid in simulation
r, then the empirical pointwise bias of f at n = i is pwbias(f, i) = 1R
∑R
r=1
∣∣f (r) (n = i)− E [b∗|n = i]∣∣,
where R is the total number of simulations. The empirical overall bias, or mean bias, of f is bias(f) =
1
|X |
∑
n∈X pwbias(f, n), where X is the space associated with n. The mean variance and the mean MSE are
likewise defined.
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Table 3: Dynamic Entry and Exit - Setup
Experiment True Mechanism Structural Model
1 Rational Expectations
Rational Expectations2 Adaptive Expectations
3 Myopic
B Dynamic Entry and Exit
Our second application concerns the modeling and estimation of firm entry and exit dynam-
ics. Structural analysis of dynamic firm behavior based on dynamic discrete choice (DDC)
and dynamic game models has been an important part of empirical industrial organization49.
These dynamic structural models capture the path dependence and forward-looking behavior
of agents, but pays the price of imposing strong behavioral and parametric assumptions for
tractability and computational convenience.
In this exercise, we focus our attention on the rational expectations assumption that
has been a key building block of dynamic structural models in macro- and microeconomic
analyses. The assumption and its variants state that agents have expectations that do not
systematically differ from the realized outcomes50. Despite having long been criticized as
unrealistic, the rational expectations paradigm has remained dominant due to a lack of
tractable alternatives and the fact that economists still know preciously little about belief
formation.
We conduct three experiments in the context of the dynamic entry and exit of firms in
competitive markets in non-stationary environments. Our data-generating models are DDC
models of entry and exit with entry costs and exogenously evolving economic conditions. In
our first experiment, agents have rational expectations about future economic conditions. In
the second experiment, agents have a simple form of adaptive expectations that assume the
future is always like the past. The third experiment features myopic agents who optimize only
their current period returns. In all experiments, we are interested in predicting the number
49See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010); Bajari et al. (2013) for surveys on structural estimation of dynamic
discrete choice and dynamic game models.
50More precisely, rational expectations are mathematical expectations based on information and probabil-
ities that are model-consistent (Muth, 1961).
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of firms that are in each market each period. To this end, we estimate (a) a statistical model,
(b) a structural model, and (c) the SRE. The structural model we estimate assumes rational
expectations and is thus correctly specified only in Experiment 1. Table 3 summarizes this
setup.
Setup Consider a market with N firms. In each period, the market structure consists of
nt incumbent firms and N − nt potential entrants. The profit to operating in the market
at time t is Rt, which we assume to be exogenous and time-varying. At the beginning of
each period, both incumbents and potential entrants observe the current period payoff Rt
and each draws an idiosyncratic utility shock it. Incumbent firms then decide whether to
remain or exit the market by weighing the expected present values of each option, while
potential incumbents decide whether or not to enter the market, which will incur a one-time
entry cost c. Specifically, let the entry status of a firm be represented by (0, 1). The time-t
flow utility of a firm, who is in state j ∈ {0, 1} in time t− 1 and state k ∈ {0, 1} in time t,
is given by
ujkit = pi
jk
t + 
k
it (19)
, where
pijkt = (µ+ α ·Rt − c · I (j = 0)) · I (k = 1) (20)
is the deterministic payoff function and it = (0it, 1it) are idiosyncratic shocks, which we as-
sume are i.i.d. type-I extreme value distributed. The parameter α measures the importance
of operating profits to entry-exit decisions relative to the idiosyncratic utility shocks.
The ex-ante value function of a firm at the beginning of a period is given by
V jt (it) = max
k∈{0,1}
{
pijkt + 
k
it + β · Et
[
V
k
t+1
]}
(21)
= max
k∈{0,1}
{
Vjkt + kit
}
(22)
, where j is the firm’s state in t − 1, β is the discount factor, V jt := E
[
V jt (it)
]
is the
expected value integrated over idiosyncratic shocks, and Vjkt := pijkt + β · Et
[
V
k
t+1
]
is the
choice-specific conditional value function.
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At the beginning of each period, after idiosyncratic shocks are realized, each firm thus
chooses its action, ait ∈ {0, 1}, by solving the following problem:
ait = arg max
k∈{0,1}
{
Vjkt + kit
}
(23)
, which gives rise to the conditional choice probability (CCP) function:
pt (k|j) := Pr (ait = k| ai,t−1 = j) = e
Vjkt∑1
`=0 e
Vj`t
(24)
, which follows from the extreme value distribution assumption.
Since the value function involves the continuation values Et
[
V
k
t+1
]
, which requires ex-
pectations of the future profits (Rt+1, Rt+2, . . .), its solution requires us to specify how such
expectations are formed. In Experiment 1, we assume firms have perfect foresight on Rt.
This is a stronger form of rational expectations that assumes individuals knows the future
realized values. Firms can then compute V jt = E
[
V jt (it)
]
, j ∈ {0, 1} in a model-consistent
way, i.e. based on the distributional assumption of it. In Experiment 2, we assume firms
have a form of adaptive expectations, according to which beliefs about the future are formed
based on past values. Here for simplicity, we assume that firms expect future profits to be
always the same as in current period, i.e. Rt = Rt+1 = Rt+2 = · · · . Finally, in Experiment
3, we allow firms to be myopic, so that they do not care about the future and only maximize
current payoffs.
Simulation For each experiment, we simulate N = 10, 000 firms for T = 500 periods.
The first T = 250 periods are used for training and the last T − T = 250 periods are
used to assess the out-of-domain performance of our estimators. The training data thus
consist of D =
{
{ait}Ni=1 , Rt
}T
t=1
. We simulate Rt to follow a rising time trend so that the
environment is non-stationary. Figure 5 shows a realized path of Rt. The model parameters
for each experiment are chosen so that the entry and exit dynamics over the first T periods
are significantly different from the last T − T periods, allowing us to better distinguish the
performance of the estimators. Appendix A.2 reports the parameter values we use as well
as other details of the simulation.
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Statistical Estimation Our goal is to predict nt – the number of firms operating in the
market in each period. The data we need for statistical modeling are (nt, Rt). We fit the
following nonlinear ARX model to the data:
nt = γ0 +
p∑
j=1
γjR
j
t +
q∑
`=1
ρ`nt−` + et (25)
, where (p, q) are again determined based on information criteria.
Structural Estimation To estimate the DDC model, we use a strategy that builds on
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) and estimates an Euler-type equation constructed out of
CCPs. Here we sketch the strategy while presenting its details in Appendix A.251.
A key to our strategy is a rational expectations assumption: we assume that because
agents have rational expectations, their expected continuation values do not deviate system-
atically from the realized values, i.e. V jt+1 = Et
[
V
j
t+1
]
+ξjt , where ξ
j
t is a time-t expectational
error with E
(
ξjt
)
= 0. Given this assumption, and since our model has the finite dependence
property of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), solution to (21) can be written in the form of the
51See Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011) for a review of related CCP estimators. For empirical implemen-
tations, see, e.g. Artuc et al. (2010); Scott (2014).
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following Euler equation:
ln
pt (k|j)
pt (j|j) =
(
pij,kt − pij,jt + β
(
pik,kt+1 − pij,kt+1
))
− β ln pt+1 (k|k)
pt+1 (k|j) + 
j,k
t (26)
, where j,kt = β
(
ξkt − ξjt
)
.
Replacing the CCPs with their sample analogues, i.e. let p̂t (k|j) = observed percentage
of firms that are in state j in t− 1 and state k in time t, we obtain the following estimating
equations: for all j 6= k,
ln
p̂t (k|j)
p̂t (j|j) + β ln
p̂t+1 (k|k)
p̂t+1 (k|j) =
µ+ αRt − (1− β) c+ e
01
t (j, k) = (0, 1)
−µ− αRt + e10t (j, k) = (1, 0)
(27)
, where et = (e01t , e10t ) is an error term that captures both the expectational errors in 
j,k
t and
the approximation errors in p̂t (k|j).
We assume that the value of the discount factor β is known. Estimating (27) gives us an
estimate of the model parameters (µ, α, c). These estimates are consistent for a model that
assumes rational expectations. Therefore, the DDC model estimated using this strategy is
correctly specified for Experiment 1, but misspecified in Experiment 2 and 3.
Structural Regularization For structural regularization, we use the DDC model with
rational expectations as the benchmark and use (25) with (p, q) = (2, 4) as the specification
for the statistical model we regularize. Since the target variable nt is serially correlated, we
use Algorithm 1 with a cross-validation procedure based on a rolling-window design that is
commonly used for time series modeling.
Results Figure 6 shows the results of the first experiment. Figure 6a plots the expected
percentage of firms in the market, E
[
nt
N
]
, for the entire periods of t = 1 − 500, covering
both the in-domain periods of t = 1− 250 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 251− 500,
together with the predictions of the three estimators. The predictions are made using one-
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Figure 6: Dynamic Entry and Exit - Experiment 1. Plotted are the true expected percentage of
firms in the market (red) along with the predictions by the three estimators. Training data are
not plotted for clarity. In (a), the entire periods of t = 1 − 500 are plotted, which covers both the
in-domain periods of t = 1− 250 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 251− 500. (b) and (c) plot
respectively the in-domain periods of t = 11− 110 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 301− 400
in order to show a more detailed picture (the plot in (b) starts at t = 11 due to nt during the
initial periods being influenced by the initial states, where we randomly assign half of the firms as
incumbents and the other half as potential entrants).
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Figure 7: Dynamic Entry and Exit - Experiment 2. Plotted are the true expected percentage of
firms in the market (red) along with the predictions by the three estimators. Training data are
not plotted for clarity. In (a), the entire periods of t = 1 − 500 are plotted, which covers both the
in-domain periods of t = 1− 250 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 251− 500. (b) and (c) plot
respectively the in-domain periods of t = 11− 110 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 301− 400
in order to show a more detailed picture.
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Figure 8: Dynamic Entry and Exit - Experiment 3. Plotted are the true expected percentage of
firms in the market (red) along with the predictions by the three estimators. Training data are
not plotted for clarity. In (a), the entire periods of t = 1 − 500 are plotted, which covers both the
in-domain periods of t = 1− 250 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 251− 500. (b) and (c) plot
respectively the in-domain periods of t = 11− 110 and the out-of-domain periods of t = 301− 400
in order to show a more detailed picture.
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Table 4: Dynamic Entry and Exit - Results
In-Domain Out-of-Domain
Experiment Estimator Bias Var MSE Bias Var MSE
1
Statistical 0.0321 0.0018 0.0033 0.1347 0.0027 0.0400
Structural 0.0012 0.0009 0.0009 0.0180 0.0143 0.0148
SRE 0.0014 0.0009 0.0009 0.0353 0.0310 0.0392
2
Statistical 0.0323 0.0046 0.0085 0.1258 0.6969 0.7371
Structural 0.0074 0.0002 0.0023 0.1621 0.0259 0.0731
SRE 0.0037 0.0001 0.0004 0.0472 0.0506 0.0668
3
Statistical 0.0329 0.0015 0.0031 0.1558 0.0047 0.0583
Structural 0.0073 0.0025 0.0026 0.2111 0.0335 0.0986
SRE 0.0010 0.0004 0.0004 0.0736 0.0661 0.1091
Notes: results are based on 100 simulation trials. Reported are the mean bias, variance,
and MSE, averaged over time t.
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step ahead forecasting52. To display the results more clearly, Figure 6b and 6c plot selected
in-domain and out-of-domain periods to offer a more detailed picture. All three estimators
fit relatively well in-domain. However, out-of-domain, the time series model is completely
unable to capture the rising market entries as Rt increases. This is partly by design: as we
have discussed, we intentionally choose parameter values so that out-of-domain dynamics
differ markedly from those in-domain. A statistical model that fits to the in-domain data is
apparently unable to extrapolate well in this case. On the other hand, the structural model,
which is correctly specified in this experiment, extrapolate very well, as expected. The SRE
performs as well as the structural model in-domain. Out-of-domain, its predictions generally
match the true values closely, except when the true percentages are close to 1. In those cases
the SRE fit tends to overshoot, which is not surprising as the SRE model does not bind nt
to be within [0, N ]. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the SRE is able to capture the rising
entries unlike the time series model.
Figure 7 shows the results of the second experiment. In Experiment 2, agents have
adaptive expectations in the sense that they always assume Rt′ = Rt ∀t′ > t. Since in our
simulations, Rt follows a rising trend, this means that agents systematically underestimate
future profits. The realized dynamics show that for most of the in-domain periods, there is
little entry into the market. Entry increases significantly during the out-of-domain periods
and indeed, for multiple periods of time, almost all firms are in the market. This marked dif-
ference between in-domain and out-of-domain dynamics pose significant challenges. Looking
at the model fits, the time series model again fits relatively well in-domain but is completely
unable to extrapolate out-of-domain. The structural model, being misspecified, is able to
capture the rising entries, but tends to over-estimate the percentages of firms in the market.
In particular, its predicted percentages tend to rise earlier and decline later than the real
ones. The model that fits the best is the SRE, which is able to match the true dynamics
closely both in-domain and out-of-domain, with the exception of periods in which the true
percentages are close to 1, as the SRE fit is unbounded.
Figure 8 shows the results of the third experiment. In this experiment, agents are myopic
52Given an estimated model, in each period t, we predict nt based on {(nt−1, nt−2, . . .) , (Rt, Rt−1, . . .)}.
To generate predictions for the structural model, we also assume agents have perfect foresight regarding
(Rt+1, Rt+2, . . .) .
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Table 5: Demand Estimation - Setup
Experiment True Mechanism Reduced-Form Structural
1 linear demand, optimal linear demandmonopoly pricing
2 linear demand, non-optimal linear demandmonopoly pricing linear demand, optimal
3 linear demand, optimal log-log demand monopoly pricingmonopoly pricing
4 linear demand, non-optimal log-log demandmonopoly pricing
in that they only care about current period returns when making entry and exit decisions.
The data-generating model is therefore static in nature. Looking at estimator performance,
the story is broadly similar to that of Experiment 2, with the time series predictions biased
toward 0 out-of-domain, the structural predictions biased toward 1, and the SRE offering
the most accurate predictions both in-domain and out-of-domain.
Table 4 reports the mean bias, variance, and mean squared error of the estimators with
respect to the true E
[
nt
N
]
over 100 trials. When correctly specified, the structural model
performs the best, as can be expected. When misspecified, the structural model exhibits
relatively large biases. The SRE consistently performs well both in-domain and out-of-
domain throughout the experiments. In particular, it delivers significantly smaller biases,
both in-domain and out-of–domain, than the statistical and the structural model when the
latter is misspecified. Although it has a higher out-of-domain variance, presumably due to
its predictions not being bounded within [0, 1], its overall performance is clearly superior to
that of the misspecified structural model in Experiment 2 and 3.
C Demand Estimation
In our final application, we revisit the demand estimation problem under a different setting.
Suppose now that instead of observing consumer demand under exogenously varying prices,
the prices we observe are set by a monopolist. In this case, changes in prices are endogenous
and the relationship between price and quantity sold is confounded. As in the motivating
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example of section 2, we are interested in learning the demand curve. To this end, if we
have access to a variable that shifts the cost of production for the monopoly firm but does
not affect demand directly, then it can be used as an instrumental variable to help identify
the true demand curve. This is the reduced-form approach. Alternatively, we can estimate
a structural model that fully specifies monopoly pricing behavior. This is the structural
approach. Finally, we can combine the two using the SRE.
In this exercise, we conduct four experiments. In all four experiments, we assume that
we do have access to a valid instrument so that the demand curve is nonparametrically
identified. However, the functional form of the reduced-form statistical model may still
be misspecified. On the other hand, using the structural approach, we estimate a model
that assumes the observed prices are optimally set by a profit-maximizing monopoly firm.
When this assumption is violated, as when for example the firm’s pricing is not optimal
or it does not have monopoly power, the structural model will also be misspecified. The
four experiments we conduct are thus arranged as follows: in the first experiment, both
the reduced-form and the structural models are correctly specified. In Experiment 2 and 3,
only one of the two is correctly specified. In Experiment 4, both are misspecified. Table 5
summarizes this setup.
This exercise differs from the previous two in two important aspects. First, our first two
applications focus on the misspecification of structural models. The statistical models they
fit are chosen using a model selection procedure so as to produce the best out-of-sample fit
of the observed data. In practice, applied reduced-form research in economics often specifies
simple linear models, so misspecification concerns are nontrivial. In this exercise, we highlight
the functional form misspecifications of the reduced-form model as well as the structural.
Second, this exercise focuses on comparisons of in-domain performance. We show that when
either the reduced-form or the structural model is misspecified, the SRE will have better
in-domain performance – more internal validity – than the misspecified model and has the
ability to outperform both when both are misspecified.
Setup Consider M geographical markets in which a product is sold. The equilibrium
price and quantity sold in market m are (pm, qm). Assume that all markets share the same
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aggregate demand function Qd (p):
qm = Q
d (pm) = α− β · pm + m (28)
In Experiment 1 and 3, we assume the product is sold by a monopoly firm who sets the
prices in each market to maximize its profit. The firm has different marginal costs cm for
operating in different markets. Hence it sets
pm = arg max
p>0
{
(p− cm)Qd (p)
}
(29)
= cm +
1
β
qm (30)
Assume that we also observe a cost-shifter zm, e.g. transportation costs, such that
cm = a+ b · zm (31)
, then zm can serve as an instrument for pm for identifying the demand curve.
In Experiment 2 and 4, we assume the monopoly firm fails to set optimal prices or does
not have complete monopoly power. Its pricing decisions are given by
pm = cm +
λ
β
qm (32)
, where λ ∈ (0, 1). The firm thus earns a lower markup than a optimal price-setting monopoly.
Simulation For each experiment, we simulateM = 1000 markets and generate an observed
data set of D = {(pm, qm, zm)}Mm=1. See Appendix A.3 for the parameter values we use in
simulation.
Reduced-Form Estimation Because pm is now endogenous – pm and m are correlated
through (30) – the statistical relation between pm and qm is confounded and no longer
represents the demand function. To estimate the demand curve using the reduced-form
approach, we avail of the instrumental variable zm and estimate Qd (p) by two-stage least
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squares (2SLS). In Experiment 1 and 2, our reduced-form model is correctly specified, i.e.
we fit (28) to the data by 2SLS. In Experiment 3 an 4, however, we assume the demand
function takes on a log-log form:
log qm = α− β · log pm + m (33)
, and is therefore misspecified in these two experiments.
Structural Estimation We fit a structural model featuring linear demand function (28)
and price-setting function (30). This structural model is correctly specified for Experiment
1 and 3, but misspecified for Experiment 2 and 4. The structural parameters are (α, β, a, b)
and can be estimated as follows: from (28) and (30), we obtain
pm = a+ b · zm + 1
β
qm (34)
If our model is correct, (34) is a deterministic linear equation system from which we can
solve directly for
(
â, b̂, β̂
)
. Substituting β̂ into (28), we then obtain α̂ = 1
M
∑M
m=1
(
qm + β̂pm
)
.
Structural Regularization To estimate the demand curve using the SRE, we employ
the structural model described above as the benchmark model and specify a 2nd degree
polynomial g (p; θ) = θ0 + θ1p+ θ2p2 as the statistical model for Qd (p). As in reduced-form
estimation, we rely on the use of the instrumental variable zm and identify θ via the following
moment conditions:
E [ (qm − g (pm; θ))| zm] = 0 (35)
The SRE proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the structural model
and generate synthetic data
(
pMm , Q
M (pMm )), where QM (p) is the model derived demand
function, i.e. the structural estimate of Q(p). We obtain θ̂M by fitting g directly to the
synthetic data. In the second stage, we minimize the objective function (9) with the following
moment functions:
mm (θ) = (qm − g (pm; θ))φ (zm) (36)
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Figure 9: Demand Estimation. Dots represent training data. The true demand curve is shown in
red. (a) - (d) correspond respectively to Experiment 1 - 4.
, where we let φ (z) = (1, z, z2, . . . , z5).
Analytical solution to (9) for a given λ is given by (14). For the weight matrixW , we use
the 2SLS weight W =
(
φ (z)′ φ (z)
)−153. The regularization procedure follows Algorithm 1.
Since no out-of-domain predictions are involved in this exercise, the standard cross-validation
procedure for i.i.d. data is used to choose the optimal λ.
Results Figure 9a plots the results of the first experiment. As the figure shows, the
observed data (pm, qm) are significantly confounded – fitting a least squares model to the
53See footnote 42.
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Table 6: Demand Estimation - Results
Reduced-Form Structural SRE
Experiment Bias Var MSE Bias Var MSE Bias Var MSE
1 0.2720 7.6780 7.7863 0.0770 0.9102 0.9161 0.9899 11.1375 13.3879
2 0.2884 5.1712 5.2821 12.3218 1.4233 203.8835 0.2783 11.4235 11.5223
3 25.9431 174.9081 2601.8750 0.1167 0.9648 0.9784 0.9703 13.0669 15.2066
4 11.8060 22.3152 423.3862 12.3212 1.4277 203.8519 0.3721 12.3088 12.5519
Notes: results are based on 100 simulation trials. Reported are the mean bias, variance, and MSE, averaged over p.
data would produce an upward-sloping curve. Despite the significant confounding, reduced-
form and structural estimation are both able to identify the true demand curve. This is
because both use correctly specified models and z is a valid instrument. In this case, the
SRE performs equally well. The three model fits and the true demand curve almost coincide.
Figure 9b plots the results of the second experiment. In this experiment, the reduced-
form model is correctly specified, while structural model is not. The structural fit therefore
deviates from the true demand curve, while the reduced-form model fits well. Figure 9c shows
the other side of the coin. In Experiment 3, the structural model is correctly specified, but
the reduced-form model is not. In this case, even though the reduced-form fit manages to
capture the downward-sloping nature of the demand curve, it is badly “out of shape”. Finally,
in Figure 9d, we show the results of Experiment 4 in which both models are misspecified and,
as a result, produce fits that depart from the true relationship. In all of these experiments,
however, the SRE fits the true demand curve well, regardless of which model – the reduced-
form or the structural or even both – is misspecified.
Table 6 reports the mean bias, variance, and mean squared error of the estimators with
respect to the true demand curve over 100 trials. When they are correctly specified, reduced-
form and structural models exhibit low biases. The structural model, by virtue of imposing
more structure on the data, attains a lower variance. When misspecified, both types of mod-
els exhibit large biases and MSEs. The SRE, in comparison, consistently attains a low bias.
Although its variance is higher than that of structural estimation, its MSE remains relatively
low and is significantly lower than the other two estimators when they are misspecified.
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D Discussion
The tension between the goal of producing an accurate description of the data and the goal
of estimating externally valid structural parameters that allow for counterfactual analysis
and policy prediction is a lasting legacy of Cowles Commission research program (Heckman,
2000). Structural estimation, in its effort to achieve the second goal, often need to make
strong and unrealistic assumptions, including both causal assumptions such as rational ex-
pectations, and parametric assumptions such as CES utility functions. Many efforts have
been made to relax these assumptions. In the context of dynamic structural models, for
example, these efforts include semiparametric estimation (Norets and Tang, 2014), robust
estimation (Christensen and Connault, 2019), and alternative specifications of expectations
(Woodford, 2013). This paper offers an alternative: rather than seeking to minimize assump-
tions and estimate partially identified models, or specify more realistic models of behavior,
which can be intractable and heterogeneous, we show the feasibility of adopting a tractable
structural model with strong assumptions as an approximate model and estimate the data
using structural regularization. A limitation with our approach is that by doing so, the
SRE estimator no longer permits a structural interpretation and therefore cannot be used
to conduct welfare analyses. We leave addressing this limitation to future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general framework for incorporating theory into statistical mod-
eling for statistical prediction and causal inference. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our
method in a number of economic applications including first-price auctions, dynamic models
of entry and exit, and demand estimation with instrumental variables. Many more potential
applications are possible, such as forecasting long-run effects based on short-run observations
or predicting effects at scale, which we leave for future work. Our method has potential ap-
plications not only in economics, but in other (social) scientific disciplines whose theoretical
models offer important insight but are subject to significant misspecification concerns.
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